Pfizer's Pfourteenth Settlement - a Small Reminder of Continuing Impunity

Well, that did not take long.  Less than a month after its last legal settlements were announced, Pfizer had to settle again.

The Details of the Settlement

This case, involving charges filed by the Texas Attorney General, was only reported locally, e.g., here in the Houston Business Journal:

The state of Texas will receive more than $36 million from two civil Medicaid fraud settlements with Pfizer Inc and Endo Pharmaceuticals,  Attorney General Greg Abbott said Friday.

Both companies will pay $18.17 million to the state, plus attorney fees and relator shares. The federal government is also entitled to a share of the total settlement, Abbott’s statement said.

As usual, the settlement was about deceptions:

 State and federal law requires drug companies disclose to the Medicaid program the prices they charge pharmacies, wholesalers and distributors for their products. Texas’ lawsuits claimed the companies misreported the price of various generic drugs and overcharged Medicaid for certain products.

As usual, Pfizer had excuses:
 

In the Pfizer settlement, the state’s investigation originally targeted entities that are now wholly owned subsidiaries of Pfizer.

In making the settlements, neither company is admitting to any wrongdoing.

New York-based Pfizer released a statement saying the safety of its subsidiaries’ products was not an issue of the investigation and Pfizer was not a target or subject of the case.

'Pfizer’s subsidiaries are resolving this investigation to avoid the further time and cost of litigation,' the company said in its statement. 'The majority of the Texas investigation focused on reporting that took place prior to the subsidiaries being acquired by Pfizer. The company remains committed to providing accurate pricing information to the Texas Medicaid program and providing quality pharmaceutical products to the citizens of Texas.'

 Of course, Pfizer acquired the companies (which were listed in the settlement document as ESI Lederle, Lederle Labs, and Pharmacia) in order to make money from them.  Furthermore, in acquiring the subsidiaries, Pfizer assumed responsibility for them and their actions.

As usual, there was no hint in the minimalist coverage of this settlement of any sort of negative consequences for anyone who authorized, directed, or implemented the relevant behavior, which did involve deception upon the government of Texas.

Nobody Held Responsible, Even After 14 Settlements

As is also usual, there was no mention in the media coverage, or the settlement document that Pfizer has made numerous other settlements in the recent past.   By my best count, the total was up to thirteen from the beginning of the 21st century to the present, as most recently tabulated here, and listed in the Appendix below.  (There may easily have been more that I missed.)

At the time of the twelfth and thirteenth settlements, we wondered whether the sheer volume of documentation of Pfizer's actions, and the sheer number of legal actions against it would finally lead to the end of the impunity of Pfizer's leaders.  After all, one would think that if the town drunk showed up in court for his fourteenth drunk driving charge, the book would be figuratively thrown at him.  Instead, at best, Pfizer had a wet noodle thrown at it.  The costs of this settlement, and even the cumulative costs of all the previous ones over time just added up to costs of doing business.  And these costs were not paid by the people who profited the most from the bad behavior, but were diffused among all stock-holders, employees, patients, and payers. 

Of course, leadership and governance of Pfizer is by some very fancy people indeed, and our society has not been good lately at holding such fancy people to any standards whatsoever.

 The sorts of practices discussed in Pfizer's multiple settlements have added to the revenue that have helped a lot of people live in the style to which they have become accustomed.  Pfizer has had some very, very well paid executives.  In 2011, according to the company's 2012 proxy statement, its CEO, Ian Read, got more than $25 million, that is to repeat more than twenty-five million dollars, count them, in total compensation.  All the rest of its named executive officers got more than $5 million in total compensation.  That 2012 report justified this other worldly munificence in part because

 We continued to improve our reputation in society through engagement with our customers, our shareholders, and the investor community.

Really, after now 14 settlements? 

The issue of the impunity of leaders of large organizations has finally made it to the big time.  For example, a New York Times editorial called the latest US government settlement with the large banks whose exploitative mortgage practices helped to usher in the global financial collapse or great recession "another slap on the wrist."  Writ large, continuing impunity is the sort of problem that indicates a degree of societal corruption that can destroy particular civilizations.

I am just a simple country doctor and can only do my small part to keep the barbarians outside the gate, but at least those who care about what has gone wrong with health care ought to be calling for vigorous, impartial law enforcement that holds leaders of health care organizations accountable for wrong-doing, and in general, changes that make leaders of health care organizations broadly accountable for their actions.

There are some luminaries from health care and academia on the current Pfizer board, like  Dennis A. Ausiello, M.D.,
Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of Medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital;  Frances D. Fergusson, Ph.D., President Emeritus of Vassar College; Helen H. Hobbs, M.D., Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute since 2002, is a Professor of Internal Medicine and Molecular Genetics and Director of the McDermott Center for Human Growth and Development at the University of Texas (UT) Southwestern Medical Center; and Marc Tessier-Lavigne, Ph.D., President of The Rockefeller University since March 2011. Maybe some people at their base institutions ought to be asking them about Pfizer's multiple ethical lapses and what they are doing to make its leadership more accountable. 

APPENDIX - Pfizer's Settlements

In the beginning of the 21st century, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, Pfizer made three major settlements,

October 2002: Pfizer and subsidiaries Warner-Lambert and Parke-Davis agreed to pay $49 million to settle allegations that the company fraudulently avoided paying fully rebates owed to the state and federal governments under the national Medicaid Rebate program for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.

May 2004: Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to settle DOJ claims involving the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Neurontin by subsidiary Warner-Lambert. The promotions included flying doctors to lavish resorts and paying them hefty speakers' fees to tout the drug. The company said the activity took place years before it bought Warner-Lambert in 2000.

April 2007: Pfizer agreed to pay $34.7 million in fines to settle Department of Justice allegations that it improperly promoted the human growth hormone product Genotropin. The drugmaker's Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to offering a kickback to a pharmacy-benefits manager to sell more of the drug.

Thereafter, Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).  Pfizer was involved in two other major cases from then to early 2010, including one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   In March, 2011, a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).  In October, 2011, Pfizer settled allegations that it illegally marketed bladder control drug Detrol (see this post). Finally, in August, 2012, Pfizer settled allegations that its subsidiaries bribed foreign (that is, with respect to the US) government officials, including government-employed doctors (see this post).

In December, 2012, Pfizer settled federal charges that its Wyeth subsidiary deceptively marketed the proton pump inhibitor drug Protonix, using systematic efforts to deceive approved by top management, and settled charges by multiple states' Attorneys' General that it deceptively marketed Zyvox and Lyrica (see this post).  

Oh, the Prices we Pay ... for Questionable Drug Marketing to Enrich Corporate Insiders - the Case of Questcor's H P Acthar Revisited

In 2007, we first discussed the case of the amazing pricing of H P Acthar, a very old drug of questionable usefulness, as an example of the irrationality of health care prices in the US, and of the failure of the organizations that ought to resist outrageous pricing in our mixed, pseudo-market based health care system to do so.  A recent New York Times article has updated this case.

Background

As we wrote in 2007, ACTH (adrenocorticotrophic hormone) is a naturally occurring hormone that stimulates the activity of the adrenal gland, which produces cortisol and other glucocorticoid and mineralocorticoid hormones.   ACTH produced from pigs' adrenals was first marketed as a biologic agent in the 1940s.  It was used for some conditions that appear to benefit from the effects of increasing cortisol production induced by ACTH.

It has been traditionally used to treat infantile spasms, a rare but distressing condition, and exacerbations of multiple sclerosis (MS).  However, since the drug was introduced so long ago, it was never subject to rigorous controlled trials to assess its efficacy and adverse effects for these indications.  Furthermore, since the 1940s, synthetic glucocorticoid hormones have become widely available as generic drugs.  Yet these slightly newer drugs have never been rigorously compared to ACTH for infantile spasms or MS.  The most recent review (edited in 2009) by the Cochrane Collaboration found that steroids and ACTH have some evidence in their favor for the treatment of acute MS, but found no evidence showing that ACTH was superior.  [Filippini G, Brusaferri F, Sibley WA, Citterio A, Ciucci G, Midgard R, Candelise L. Corticosteroids or ACTH for acute exacerbations in multiple sclerosis. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2000, Issue 4. Art. No.: CD001331. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD001331].  Also, the most recent review (edited in 2009) of treatment of infantile spasms concluded, "it is not clear which treatment [including ACTH] is optimal." [Hancock ED, Osborne JP, Edwards SW. Treatment of infantile spasms.  Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2008, Issue 4. Art. No. : CD001770. DOI: 10.1002/14541858.CD001700.pub2.]

The Pricing of H P Acthar

Possibly because some physicians thought ACTH might be useful for some patients with two conditions, infantile spasms and acute exacerbations of MS, ACTH has remained on the market.  It was manufactured by a single company, Aventis, (now part of Sanofi-Aventis), the successor to Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer.  In 2001, Aventis sold the rights to manufacture ACTH, with the trade name H P Acthar, to a new, small biotechnology company, Questcor.  In 2007, Questcor raised the price of ACTH from $1650 per vial to more $23,000 per vial.  That got the attention of the Philadelphia Inquirer, on whose article we based our commentary. We used the price increase as an example of how pricing in health care has become untethered from any sort of clinical reality, and wondered why insurance companies and the US government seemed willing to pay this outrageous price for an old drug with little evidence from clinical research to support its use.  But the issue then seemed, like many others we have discussed , to become anechoic, until the very end of 2012.


Now the  New York Times story has provided an example of how health care corporations can do very well without doing anyone, except corporate insiders, much good.  It included instances of many of the kinds of ethically questionable practices we have discussed over the years on Health Care Renewal.

Deceptive Marketing

Per the NY Times,

Questcor did almost no research or development to bring Acthar to market, merely buying the rights to the drug from its previous owner for $100,000 in 2001. And while the manufacturing of Acthar is complex, it accounts for only about 1 cent of every dollar that Questcor charges for the drug.

Moreover, the tiny 'orphan' market soon became much bigger. Before long, Questcor began marketing the drug fo multiple sclerosis, nephrotic syndrome and rheumatologic conditions, even though there is little evidence that Acthar is more effective for those other conditions than alternatives that are far cheaper. And the company did so without being required to prove that the drug actually works. That is because Acthar was approved for use in 1952, before the Food and Drug Administration required clinical trials to show a drug is effective for a particular disease. Acthar is essentially grandfathered in. 

Today, only about 10 percent of the drug’s sales are for infantile spasms. The new uses, Mr. Bailey has told analysts, represent multibillion-dollar opportunities for Acthar and Questcor, its sole maker. 

The results have been beyond even the company’s wildest dreams. Sales of Acthar, which accounts for essentially all of Questcor’s sales, totaled nearly $350 million in the first nine months this year, up 145 percent from the period a year earlier. In the same period, Questcor’s earnings per share nearly tripled, to $2.12. In the five years after the big Acthar price increase in August 2007, Questcor shares rose from around 60 cents to about $50, in one of the best performances of any stock in any industry. 

So Questcor leadership was clever enough to use loopholes in the law to promote ACTH for particular kinds of patients without any good evidence that it did those patients any good.  Furthermore, Questcor used several questionable tactics 

in this promotion.

Manipulated Research

Apparently Questcor leaders decided they needed some sort of minimal research results to promote their products, so as the Times reported,

Because Acthar was approved for these conditions decades ago, Questcor has not had to do large clinical trials to show that the drug works. It has paid for some small studies, mainly by individual doctors, who then publish a paper that the sales force can present to doctors. 

The study that justified calling on rheumatologists involved five patients with rare conditions, all of them treated by a single doctor. All the patients had much improvement on Acthar after failing to benefit from more standard therapies, the doctor, Todd Levine, said in a Questcor conference call.

Too call the research Questcor sponsored minimalist would be too polite.  A case series of five patients, lacking any control group proves almost nothing.  It proves less when the research is done in an unblinded  fashion by a single doctor who presumably was invested in the outcome being favorable for his sponsor's product.  (I suppose some might quibble with calling this research manipulated, but I contend but doing such crude research when it would be possible to do something much more credible amounts to manipulation.)

Suppression of Research

Moreover, it seems that even such rudimentary studies sometimes failed to produce the wanted results.  In these cases, the Times reported that Questcor simply suppressed them.

Still, it appears that at least a couple of small studies that may have raised questions about the drug have been suspended. 

'From my standpoint it just didn’t work,' said Dr. Sungchun Lee, a Phoenix nephrologist who stopped a small study testing Acthar as a treatment for nephrotic syndrome. 'I think they were O.K. with me stopping because we weren’t getting the results,' he said. 

Another study that was terminated sought to determine whether multiple sclerosis patients who did not have a good response to steroids should be treated with either another round of steroids or with Acthar. The study was halted midway through 'to analyze data,' according to the summary of the trial on the federal clinical trial database. 

Use of Paid Key Opinion Leaders

Despite the lack of good clinical evidence in support ACTH, there are some physicians who defend its use.  One example in the Times article was a physician who is paid by Questcor

But some doctors say Acthar can be effective in cases that are not well treated by steroids. They say that there is emerging evidence that Acthar does more than just stimulate the body to produce its own steroids. 

'It really looks like the ACTH does bring something different to the table that standard steroids don’t,' said Dr Ben W Thrower, director of the multiple sclerosis institute at the Shepherd Center, a hospital in Atlanta. Dr. Thrower, who is a paid speaker for Questcor, said his institute had tried Acthar for about 60 of its 3,000 patients, ones who did not respond to steroid treatment. Acthar made the symptoms subside in about half of them.

Where to begin?  Just because ACTH is different does not mean it is better.  Since MS is a disease whose symptoms wax and wane, patients who fail standard treatment may get better on their own, and without a control group, it is impossible to say whether the ACTH given to such patients was the reason they got better. 

Creation of Institutional Conflicts of Interest for Disease Specific Foundations

Questcor's ACTH also has support from a disease specific foundation, but one that Questcor has also supported financially.

Dr Lawrence Brown, a neurologist at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, and the president of the Child Neurology Foundation, says of Questcor: 'They have gone out of their way to help every kid who needs the medicine to get it quickly and efficiently.'

This year, the foundation awarded its first corporate citizenship award to Questcor. Dr. Brown says Questcor’s donations — the amount has not been disclosed — to the foundation didn’t influence the award.

Who could be so naive to think that giving an organization funding might influence its actions?  After all, human response to financial incentives is the basis for most current economic thinking.

Insiders Get Rich

Admittedly, these questionable tactics did lead to an increase in "shareholder value,"  As the company's proxy statement boasted in 2011,

While we generated strong financial returns in 2011, we are most proud of our patient focus and investments in Questcor which we believe will generate sustainable value to our shareholders, employees, patients and all of the communities that we serve. We believe that our patient focus and commitment to generating sustainable value to all of our constituencies results in strong value creation for our shareholders.

However, as of today, Qustcor's share price has dropped to $26.74 from a peak of 53.42 in June, 2012, with most of the drop in December, 2012, around the time the Times article came out, according to Google Finance.  So whether share holder value will turn out to have increased in the long run is not clear. 

Meanwhile, some Questcor employees did very well.  The largess started with some drug representatives,

Questcor sales representatives who are lucky enough or skillful enough to have a big prescriber in their territory can reap bonuses of $50,000 a quarter, according to former employees of the company.

More highly placed corporate insiders did even better.

Executives are paid well, too. In 2009, Mr. Bailey, [the CEO]  hired his daughter Kirsten Fereday as director of business analytics and evaluation, a job that paid $275,000 in cash and stock last year. 

 Left out of the Times article, somewhat surprisingly, was what the top executives make.  Information from up to 2011 is publicly available, however, in proxy fillings.

In the company's 2012 proxy statement, we find the following figures for total compensation:
Don M Bailey, President and CEO - $4,546,230, up 192% of his compensation in $1,554,503 in 2009
Michael H Mulroy, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel -  $1,749,891 (his first year)
Stephen L Cartt, Chief Operating Officer -  $2,298,308, up 168% from $855,460 in 2009
David J Medeiros, Executive Vice President and Chief Technical Officer - $1,232,556, up 78% from $692,188 in 2009
David Young Pharm D, Chief Scientific Officer - $1,948,804 up 182% from $1,066,159 in 2009

In addition, by 2011, Mr Bailey, the CEO, had acquired 1.92% of the company's total stock, 3,834,910 shares, today worth $102,545,490.

Finally, per the Times,

one group of shareholders has done pretty well for itself. Over the last two years, as the company’s share price mainly soared, Questcor insiders have sold more than $100 million of stock. 

Summary

 So, in summary, a small biotechnology company drastically increased the price of its only product, a drug which has never been subject to modern clinical trials, and whose efficacy has never been proven.  Its marketing tactics have included manipulation and suppression of research, and payments to physicians and non-profit organizations.  Although its most breathtaking price increases were made in 2007, they attracted little public attention until five years later.   Meanwhile, corporate insiders, from drug representatives to top executives and their relatives, have done very well for themselves.

In the US, there a lot of people who advocate free market based health care for its efficiency and innovation.  For example, see "Yes, Mr President, a Free Market Can Fix Health Care," published by the Cato Institute, in which its Director of Health Policy Studies proclaimed, "The great advantage of a free market is that innovation and more prudent decisionmaking means that fewer patients will fall through the cracks," and then "a free market can and would control costs, expand choice, improve health care quality, and make health coverage more secure." [italics added for emphasis]

Unfortunately, the case of Questcor's ACTH makes it seem that in the current US system, which is supposedly more market based than systems in many other countries, the efficiency and innovation is characteristic of the marketing of corporate health care, not of the health care itself.  Here is a stellar example of how clever, and not always very scrupulous marketing can be used to sell a very old drug with little demonstrated clinical value for a stratospheric price, enriching corporate insiders, perhaps enriching stockholders (although, not so much lately, and we will see how they do in 2013), at the expense of the public who pays taxes and insurance premium.  This case suggests a need for more attention to market failures and less insistence on market fundamentalism.  Of course, it also suggests the continuing need for health care professionals, policy makers, patients and the public to be extremely skeptical about heavily promoted commercial health products.

Health Care Hired Managers Not Playing by the Same Rules - the Example of Lancaster General Health

That all people in the US do not play by the same rules, and that more specifically the richest people do not play by the same rules as the somewhat or a lot less rich, became a topic of discussion after the 2008 global financial collapse/ great recession.  A powerful discussion of this theme appeared in Predator Nation, the book by Charles Ferguson that followed his award winning documentary, Inside Job:

Ponder the toxic effects of too much wealth, too much power, the new culture of American investment banking, and a life conducted within the cocoon of America's new oligarchy. [p 112]

He focused on the culture of finance, but as we have seen, this culture has overlapped the culture of health care.  Thus we have shown multiple examples of those who have become rich due to their positions in health care, almost always positions as high-ranking hired managers of health care organizations.  They get paid according to different rules than apply to other hired employees, and live by different rules than their less-favored fellow employees, again by virtue of their positions.

Some of these examples were of CEOs of huge, for-profit health care corporations,  However, we have increasingly seen hired managers of moderate size non-profit organizations who also appear to play by different rules than their fellow employees.

The Executives of Lancaster General Health

The latest example appeared through reporting found in LancasterOnline, the web presence of several newspapers in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, about a regional community health care system, Lancaster General Health.  The system includes one major hospital, Lancaster General, an obstetrics hospital, and a variety of satellites and out-patient facilities.    

The system was facing challenges in 2010:

In 2010, times were getting tougher for Lancaster General Health.

The mammoth [sic] health care system would notch record revenues of nearly $1 billion that year. But its annual surplus fell for the fourth straight year. Though destitute by no means, galloping expenses and uncertainty in the marketplace were hammering LGH's business model, prompting changes. Two units were closed, some positions were eliminated, and 170 employees were reassigned.

However, despite these difficulties,

Two executives — CEO Tom Beeman, who was on military leave part of the year, and Executive Vice President Jan Bergen, who helped fill in for Beeman in his absence — earned more than $1 million in total compensation; another six got at least $500,000.

And those top 21 executives collectively received more than $2 million in bonuses and incentives.

That lavish total compensation included "perks" that were likely not furnished to lesser employees, for example

The IRS form lists few explicit perks, save one: LGH paid $1,044 in social club dues for Beeman in 2010.

Said Regina Mingle, LGH's executive vice president of human resources: 'In this community, if you need to do business, you do it at the Hamilton Club or Lancaster Country Club. We decided ... we would pay those fees.'

It seems doubtful, however, that any other employees who felt that they did "business" at country clubs or similar establishments were entitled to subsidized dues.

This relatively lavish pay was part of a pattern.  Executive compensation had been increasing out of proportion to any obvious benchmark for a while.

 In fiscal year 2005-06, CEO Tom Beeman earned a comparatively modest total compensation of $646,094. By 2010, that had more than doubled, to $1.35 million. That figure included a base compensation of $606,728, along with $345,000 in bonuses and incentives and $279,511 in retirement and other deferred compensation.

Bergen, who along with Executive Vice President Marion A. McGowan took on some of Beeman's duties when he left in October 2010 for a nine-month military leave of absence, saw her compensation rise from $332,823 in 2005-06 to a total of $1.1 million in 2010. The latter figure included $425,967 in base pay, $177,752 in bonuses and incentives, $111,383 in retirement and other deferred compensation, and $320,208 in what the IRS calls 'other reportable compensation' such as employee contributions to 401(k) or 403(b) retirement plans.

The third highest-paid LGH executive in 2010 was McGowan, whose compensation package totaled $772,978, including $456,789 in base pay and $192,226 in bonuses and incentives. Fourth on the list was 

Dr. Lee M. Duke II, senior vice president and chief physician executive, whose compensation totaled $746,830, including $405,083 in base pay and $140,377 in bonuses and incentives.

Fifth was Chief Financial Officer F. Joseph Byorick Sr., whose total compensation of $652,667 included $397,160 in base pay and $140,500 in bonuses and incentives.

So note that CEO Beeman's compensation was for less than one full year's worth of work.  His annualized rate would have been even more.

A companion article noted that part of CEO Beeman's bonus for 2010 was justified by his efforts to keep in touch with the institution while he was physically not present, and was, in fact off-site for an extended period fulfilling a military reserve commitment

 In October 2010, Lancaster General Health had a problem.

Its CEO, Tom Beeman, was shipping out for a military tour of duty, to serve as deputy director of the National Intrepid Center of Excellence in Bethesda, Md. Two other administrators —  Executive Vice Presidents Jan Bergen and Marion W. McGowan — would step into Beeman's shoes while he was away.

Yet Beeman stayed involved. 'We had regular Skype [video-conferencing] calls,' said Alex Henderson, chairman of the LGH Board of Trustees.

That, LGH officials believed, merited a bonus. So Beeman got nearly $90,000 for his efforts in absentia.

Note that this verified that Beeman got more than $1 million in compensation despite not having worked a whole year, since it was necessary for two other executives to take over his work.

Furthermore, while US law does mandate employers to re-hire employees who take leaves to fulfill military reserve commitments (look here),  I suspect that very few employers pay employees anything while they are away (although reservists are certainly paid by the government for their reserve duty).  However, Beeman got a bonus merely for keeping in touch while he was away doing another job.  I further suspect it is extremely unusual to pay an employee a bonus for trying to keep in touch during his or her military service.

So the reporting on compensation given to top hired managers at Lancaster General emphasized that executive pay is set using very different rules than are used to set the pay of other employees.

The Talking Points Reappear as Justifications for Exceptional Compensation of Hired Managers

Furthermore, the justifications made for the Lancaster General top executives' large compensation packages echoed talking points used to support such largess for top hired managers in other health care settings, but did not explain why hired managers merit exceptional treatment.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, and here.   The talking points are:
-  we pay what everyone else pays
-  CEOs work hard and are brilliant, and so deserve high pay
-  high pay is needed to attract and retain competent, if not brilliant people.

None of the examples of these talking points we have seen so far explain why these apply to CEOs and other top hired managers, but not to other kinds of employees.  .

We Pay What Everyone Else Pays

A third article in the LancasterOnline series noted that executive compensation was based on information on what everyone else pays,

nonprofits must hire consultants to study how similarly sized nonprofits pay their executives.

LGH's consultant is a firm called Mercer, headquartered in New York City with an office in Philadelphia. Charlie Scott, of Mercer, has in recent years helped LGH determine what to pay its highest-compensated executives.

 'Our role is to be [an] independent source of market norms,' said Scott, determining 'levels of compensation available in the market for executive positions, as well as how compensation is paid.

This is an interesting variant of this talking point, because it essentially blames the reasoning on the Internal Revenue Service.  The article did not explain how Mercer determined the extent of the appropriate market, nor how it obtained a representative sample of data about that market.

CEOs Work Hard and Are Brilliant, and So Deserve High Pay

High Pay is Needed to Attract and Retain Competent, if not Brilliant People

These justifications are often combined.  In the case of Lancaster General, the examples included

At LGH, officials say the generous compensation is necessary to attract and retain the top talent. Said Lancaster attorney Alex Henderson III, chairman of the Lancaster General Health board of trustees and its compensation committee, which decides what to pay top execs: 'Demand for top-notch hospital executives has grown, and we have to respond to that.'

'We're not looking to be average.'

I seriously doubt that the hospital system is committed to "generous" pay to get "top talent" for all of its job openings.  Again, I doubt the generosity includes full pay for leaves taken for military service, or, for that matter country club dues.

Another version was offered by the chair of the system's board of trustees:

 Trustee Henderson said that as LGH's goal isn't to maximize revenue but save lives, executives can be doing a fantastic job — worthy of six-figure bonus and incentive pay — even when the system's financial performance slips.

Consider an executive who devises a way to shorten stays for patients, Henderson said: 'That's great for the patients, for insurance companies, for nurses who don't have to take care of people who don't need to be here' — but it's bad for LGH's bottom line.

Left out of the first part of the statement was how one could attribute lives saved to the work of a hired manager, especially, as in the case of CEO Beeman, a manager with no direct experience caring for patients.  Mr Beeman's official hospital bio listed this educational background,

Prior to joining Lancaster General Health, he served at Saint Thomas Health Services as its President and Chief Executive Officer, and the Senior Vice President for Hospital Operations and Executive Director of the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania.

It did not include any former positions that would have involved direct patient care. 

Health care actually does not save lives that often, but hopefully does often ameliorate disease and injury, reduce suffering and improve function.  However, the people who actually directly accomplish this are health care professionals, nurses, doctors, therapists, etc, not managers who sit in offices.  

I will merely note that Mr Henderson's second example apparently was theoretical.  There was no example given of an executive who actually did shorten length of stay.  

In a third article in the LancasterOnline series, the compensation consultant employed by Lancaster General Health reiterated the argument that one must pay top dollar for scarce managerial talent:

[Mercer consultant Charlie] Scott said that the law of supply and demand that applies 'to any type of talent pool applies to health care executives. There's normally a lack of supply of what's considered blue-chip talent ... [and] the increasing complexity of the health care industry requires an increasing level of talent and capability.'

Note that no one who defended the compensation given to CEO Beeman or other top managers provided evidence that they are "top" or "blue chip" talent, or that they, rather than the health care professionals who work at or for the system save lives.

Summary

In our last US election campaign season, a few candidates pledged to level the playing field so that rich and poor would play by the same rules.  Other candidates scoffed at the importance of the problem, or called its invocation class warfare.  Meanwhile, in health care, we just accumulate more examples that different people play by different rules.

So we have yet another particular example of how top hired managers, particularly CEOs, of even modestly sized, non-profit health care organizations get to play by different rules than those affecting other employees, and other people who work in health care.  As in previous cases, the justifications provided for these different rules were basically a repeat of poorly conceived arguments that have been cited often by defenders of executive exceptionalism. 

The "we pay what everyone else pays" is basically an appeal to common practice fallacy.  Why we have to do so is never stated.  In any case, the argument did not include why the limited selection of comparator hospitals and executives used is a representative sample of "everyone."  Furthermore, as we noted here, what evidence there is suggests that skills required to run one organization do not necessarily transfer to another, suggesting the comparison to "everyone" makes no sense.

As is usual, the "CEOs are brilliant" argument is basically an appeal to authority fallacy, and provided no evidence that the particular CEO is brilliant.  In fact, it seems that everyone who has used this talking point before claims his or her CEO is brilliant. (Look here for example.) Obviously, all CEOs cannot be above average. 

Finally, as noted here, there is no evidence that without high pay worthy leaders could not be hired or retained.

Unfortunately, the otherwise excellent articles on Lancaster General did not challenge any of the defenders of executive exceptionalism to better justify their assertions.  Nor were they asked to consider its adverse effects. 

As we have frequently said, current policies about paying hired health care managers leave the managers unaccountable for the effects of their actions on patients' and the public's health, and worse, fail to deter and may even encourage ignorance of the health care mission, frankly mission-hostile behavior, self-interest, conflicts of interest, and outright corruption.  Meanwhile, paying nearly all top managers as if they were brilliant, while setting much harsher standards for the employees who actually take care of patients, including health professionals, demoralizes those on whom patients actually depend for care.

As we have said endlessly,....   Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Will the Circle be Unbroken? - Hospital Executive Compensation Continues to Defy Gravity and Logic

A report from Health Leaders Media, a prominent media site about health care management, shows how non-profit hospital executive compensation continues to levitate.  In general,

For not-for-profit CEOs nationwide the median total cash compensation (base plus incentives) increased 3% to 6.7% over last year, and these organizations' senior leadership teams gained similar pay increases,...

The specifics included

Health system CEOs' median base salaries increased to $717,500 (2012) from $650,000 (2011), while independent hospital CEOs' median base salaries rose to $506,100 from $472,000 during that period, according to IHS. Comparatively, Sullivan, Cotter and Associates shows the base pay for system CEOs nationwide increased while the TCC declined slightly—base pay increased to $334,700 from $325,000, while TCC decreased to $411,100 from $412,100 from 2012 to 2011, respectively. Unlike their health system counterparts, independent hospital CEOs' base pay and TCC climbed between 2011 and 2012—base pay went up to $530,000 from $504,000 (a 4.9% gain) and TCC jumped 4.3% to $600,000 from $574,000.

The report also showed that pay increased for some species of top executives.  CIOs (chief information officers) did the best,

Nationally, system CIOs received one of the largest TCC increases year over year, according to Sullivan, Cotter and Associates (5.8%). IHS reported a median base salary increase of (3.5%).

These increases ought to be compared to the base rate for the population.  In September, the Census Bureau reported that median family income dropped in 2011 (per the New York Times):

 Median household income after inflation fell to $50,054, a level that was 8 percent lower than in 2007, the year before the recession took hold.

The actual decline from 2010 to 2011 was 1.5% (look here).

So executive compensation in health care continues to defy gravity, even as the income of the typical family does the opposite. 

Will the Circle be Unbroken?

Conveniently, the day before, another well regarded site for hospital management information, Becker's Hospital Review, provided a rationale for current health care executive compensation, based on a blog post from Integrated Healthcare Strategies, which claims to be one of the largest US healthcare consulting firms.

The Review article first noted that "executive compensation is a delicate subject," without explaining why it was more delicate than the compensation given to other people.  It then answered the question its title posed, "are hospital executives paid too much?"  In summary,

compensation levels are currently appropriate, on the whole, because employers are generally keeping them on the job with such consistent pay levels.

The syntax is a little difficult, but I believe the translation is the circular cliche, "it is what it is."  More formally, this appears to be a version of begging the question, or circular reasoning.

The Integrated Healthcare Stragies blog post by David Bjork, "thought leader," Senior Vice President and Senior Advisor, who authored two books on executive compensation in health care, rotated this again.

ARE EXECUTIVES PAID TOO MUCH?  The short answer is no. Executives are not overpaid. If they were, employers would not willingly pay them as much as they do.

And again

the intrinsic value of a job can be quantified. Economists and most workers judge the value of a job by how much it pays. A job is worth what an employer is willing to pay an employee to do it, or what an employee is willing to accept as payment for the job. Virtually no one doubts that principle—except when it comes to executive jobs.

Have we got that?  Bjork argued that executive pay is self-justifying.  All executives are worth what they are paid because that is what they are paid.

Another way to understand the fallaciousness of this argument is to try to apply it to jobs other than executive positions.  Presumably, it would mean that everybody's pay is appropriate, and hence nobody's pay could ever be changed.  But one's head begins to hurt just trying to think about this.

Yet those were the main arguments that Mr Bjork made to justify his contention that

There is no rational basis for the view that executives should not be paid as much as they are paid, just a personal attitude, generally held by someone who is paid less.

A Side Trip to the Fallacy of Composition

Mr Bjork did make an attempt to supplement that argument.  For example, he wrote "labor market forces drive pay for executives," without explaining how much they do so, or the nature of the market for executive pay.  Later, he wrote,

Hospitals and health systems continually look for ways to reduce their costs. When they come across jobs that cost more than they are worth, they eliminate the jobs and either eliminate the work, redistribute it to other employees, or outsource it to cheaper labor. They view executive jobs the same way. When hospitals and health systems find an executive job that seems to cost more than it is worth, they eliminate it if they can and redistribute the work to other managers.

Let us unpack this a bit.  First, hospital and health systems are organizations composed of humans.  They do not look for anything, but the executives who run them may certainly look for ways to reduce costs and eliminate apparently unnecessary jobs.  Confusing hospital executives with the organizations they run appears to be a version of the fallacy of composition, which "arises when a person reasons from the characteristics of individual members of a class or group to a conclusion regarding the characteristics of the entire class or group (taken as a whole)."

Taken literally, this paragraph suggested that executives could decide their own jobs "cost more than they are worth," and then fire themselves and give their work to someone else.   

Nonetheless, were this targument to be true, it in fact contradicts the conclusion based on this argument that appeared two sentences later

Therefore, executives must be worth what they are paid, because employers keep them on the job and willingly continue to pay what¬ever they are paid.

Note that this conclusion is yet another restatement of the circular argument above.  . 

Summary

We have noted that logical fallacies are increasingly deployed to defend the status quo in health care, and particularly to defend the interests of those who are profiting the most from the current dysfunctional system.  In our latest example we find some particularly ripe repitition of a fundamentally fallacious argument to support ever rising compensation for health care executives.  It is distressing that the arguments were made by a prominent health care management consultant and published author on the subject of health care executive pay, and was picked up without question by a prominent health care management media site.  It suggests, like other posts we have written about the generous use of logical fallacies to protect the powers that be, that these eminences really may have not the slightest idea what they are doing, and have truly risen to their level of incompetence, if not ridiculousness; or else, they do know what they are doing, but have nothing but contempt for the reasoning powers of anyone outside their circle, and feel no need to justify their actions to such hoi polloi.

The sheer foolishness of arguments made to protect the status quo ought to lead the rest of us, particularly health care professionals, to question that status quo further. 

The ability of top executives of many, probably most health care organizations to collect bloated paychecks out of proportion to, if not despite their performance attracts the wrong people to lead these organizations, and provides incentives for even the right people to lead badly.

Until we make health care leaders accountable, and until their incentives reflect their ability to uphold the health care mission, expect more unaccountable leadership that subverts the health care mission, and hence continually rising costs, declining access, and deteriorating quality.

More Reasons to Doubt How CEOs are Chosen and Paid

Health Care Renewal is about problems with the leadership and governance of health care organizations.  Since the global financial collapse/ great recession began in 2008, it became evident that the problems we saw affecting health care leadership were similar to problems affecting other large organizations, notably financial firms.  Recently, I spotted a series of articles that raise more questions about how business leaders, and by extension, leaders of health care organizations are chosen and paid.

Doubts about Generic Managers

We have often questioned the wisdom of having health care organizations lead by people with little if any direct health care experience, little knowledge of health care on the ground, and little commitment to health care's core values.  We have called such leaders generic managers.

A New York Times article by Gretchen Morgenson from September, 2012, cited new academic work that questioned the abilities of generic managers.  The source article was Elson CM, Ferrere CK.  Executive superstars, peer groups, and overcompensation - cause, effect and solution.  Ms Morgenson summarized,

Mr. Elson and Mr. Ferrere conclude, contrary to the prevailing line, that chief executives can’t readily transfer their skills from one company to another.

Furthermore, Ms Morgenson interviewed Mr Elson, who said,

But we found that C.E.O. skills are very firm-specific. C.E.O.’s don’t move very often, but when they do, they’re flops.

Also,

But there is little evidence, according to Mr. Elson and Mr. Ferrere, that a hot market exists for interchangeable chief executives. First, they note numerous academic studies indicating that C.E.O.’s selected from within a company perform better than outsiders, especially in the creation of long-term shareholder value.

'There is no conclusive empirical evidence that outside succession leads to more favorable corporate performance, or even that good performance at one company can accurately predict success at another,' the authors conclude. 'In short, executive skills cannot pass the most basic test of generality: transferability.'

To be sure, this flies in the face of the widely held view that skilled managers have become generalists and are therefore far more interchangeable than in previous years. Proponents of this thesis argue that top managers today can accumulate a broad knowledge of economics, finance and management science, giving them the ability to manage any type of company effectively. Technological advancements also give chief executives access to untold amounts of data about a particular company that in previous times would have taken years to amass and synthesize, this view holds.

But the data on actual C.E.O. moves raises questions about just how portable C.E.O. skills really are. The Delaware paper cites several studies indicating that relatively few chief executives land new top jobs elsewhere. One study, a 2011 analysis of roughly 1,800 C.E.O. successions from 1993 to 2005, found that less than 2 percent had been public-company chief executives before their new jobs.

This data and these observations seem to broadly apply to business executives, but there is no reason to think they do not apply to executives of health care corporations.  Furthermore, given that on its face, health care is less like making automobiles than, say, the restaurant business is, there is no reason to think doubts this raises about the abilities of generic managers should not be even bigger in health care, and should apply not just to for-profit, but to not for profit corporations.  Yet the trend in health care seems to increasingly favor generic managers of not just for-profit health care corporations, but also hospitals and hospital systems, non-profit health insurers and managed care organizations, health care charities, disease advocacy groups, and even medical associations, medical schools, and their parent universities.  

Doubts about Executive Compensation

Peer-Group Benchmarking

We have often posted about amazingly generous compensation given to top leaders of health care organizations.  Health care corporate CEOs can make tens of millions of dollars, occasionally even more.  While CEOs of not for profit health care organizations make less, they still now can makes millions of dollars.  Ms Morgenson called the usual justification for these huge amounts of compensation the "pay-'em-or-lose-'em" myth.

Corporations are forever defending big executive paydays. If we don’t pay up, the argument goes, our sharpest minds will jump to our rivals.

This notion, or myth, depends on the argument that generic managers are the best managers, which appears to be largely unsubstantiated, as we noted above.

 In other words, the argument that C.E.O.’s will leave if they aren’t compensated well, perhaps even lavishly, is bogus. Using the peer-group benchmark only pushes pay up and up. 

Furthermore,

Importantly, the study disputes the notion that executive pay today is a result of an efficient bidding process for finding and retaining a scarce and valuable commodity: managerial talent. 'In essence, this process creates a model of a competitive market for executives where it otherwise does not exist,' the authors wrote. 'Through the operation of a market, it is argued, wages are bid up to an executive’s outside opportunities.'

Instead, as noted above, since the skills needed to run one sort of company or organization may not readily transfer to other companies and organizations, even seemingly similar ones, such a market does not exist. 
 
 Incentives Based on Short-Term Financial Results

We have also previously discussed (look here) how contemporary economic dogma suggest that the only measure of success of a for-profit corporation is "shareholder value," which has come to mean the stock price over the short term.  There is reason to think that this focus on short-term economic performance has also become the major measure of success of health care organizations.  Another word for this phenomenon is "financialization."  

An op-ed in the UK Independent questions this focus because of its economic effects.  Anthony Hilton wrote about the views of Andrew Smithers,

His starting point was that the economy was floundering because of inadequate demand. Personal spending is flat for obvious reasons but the real culprit is the companies who are hoarding cash and refusing to invest.

Others have noticed the cash hoarding but explain it away by saying we live in uncertain times and companies will start investing again once they become more confident about the economic outlook. Smithers disagrees fundamentally with this. He says companies are not investing because executives are bonused to deliver short-term profits. Costly spending on investment projects is therefore anathema to them. Investment may deliver long-term prosperity but by that time they will have left the company. It also depresses short-term profits while they are still there.

We have in the last two decades, under the mantra of shareholder value and aligning the interests of management with shareholders, created a new breed of management incentivised to believe that what is good for them is good for the business. They dislike investment because it reduces their bonuses .

They don't invest surplus cash. They hoard it or they use it to buy back their own company's shares.

When the majority of the managements in publicly quoted companies start behaving this way, as they now do, we have a serious problem. They are sitting on cash which is the equivalent of six per cent of GDP. This deadweight of unused resources prevents lift-off and threatens to leave the economy forever trapped in the mire.

Smithers says this behaviour by management is a structural change — meaning it is something which won't go away. It makes this down- turn different from all that have gone before.

There is no reason to think that health care corporations are not hoarding money in the sense described above.  If so, they may be failing to invest in drugs or devices that would have helped patients in the future.

Because of the limited reporting required of large health care non-profit organizations in the US, it may be very hard to tell if they are similarly hoarding money, but if they are, the effects again might be to fail to provide patients long-term benefits they might otherwise have enjoyed.

The Ultimately Self-Destructive Outcome

Meanwhile, writing in the New York Times, Chrystia Freeland, the author of Plutocrats: the Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else, explained why picking the wrong leaders  and paying them too much may be bad for everyone.  We have noted that an increasing fraction of the wealthiest one percent of the US are current and former corporate executives.  Ms Freeland wrote how domination by an increasingly wealthy and powerful elite usually dooms the countries they dominate.

what separates successful states from failed ones is whether their governing institutions are inclusive or extractive. Extractive states are controlled by ruling elites whose objective is to extract as much wealth as they can from the rest of society.

So

it is the danger America faces today, as the 1 percent pulls away from everyone else and pursues an economic, political and social agenda that will increase that gap even further — ultimately destroying the open system that made America rich and allowed its 1 percent to thrive in the first place.  

Furthermore,

It is no accident that in America today the gap between the very rich and everyone else is wider than at any time since the Gilded Age. Now, as then, the titans are seeking an even greater political voice to match their economic power. Now, as then, the inevitable danger is that they will confuse their own self-interest with the common good. The irony of the political rise of the plutocrats is that, like Venice’s oligarchs, they threaten the system that created them.

So it is not merely that overcompensating generic executives has likely been one of the major reasons our health care is so expensive, inaccessible, and mediocre.  The larger problem of overpaying under skilled executives threatens to destroy our whole society.  How cheerful

Summary

The way forward seems clear.  It is just blocked by the interests of the rich and powerful elite which our current foolish policies have created.

In a health care context, leaders of organizations should only be those with clear knowledge of, experience in, and commitment to the values of health care.  Their compensation should be reasonable, and based on their ability to uphold these values first, with financial goals clearly second, and short-term financial goals probably not at all.  Pay should not be bench-marked to compensation of leaders of other organizations, especially not of vastly different kinds of organizations.

Whether there is any chance of such changes happening while corporate boards of directors, and non-profit boards of trustees are dominated by executives of other organizations is doubtful.  Thus we also need to change the governance of for-profit health care corporations to clearly reflect the long-term interests of the stockholders, who will only prosper if in the long run their companies provide products and services that help patients at a fair price and with minimal risks.   Thus we further need to need to change the governance of health care non-profits to reflect the needs of patients, their communities and other key constituencies.  That should keep us all busy for a while. 
 

Duchess of WellPoint Abdicates, Likely to Escape with Much Loot

A change in the leadership of one of the biggest health care organizations reveals a little more about how such leadership has become our new corporate royalty and nobility.

The Departure of WellPoint CEO Angela Braly

The basics of the story, as reported by the Anna Wilde Matthews in the Wall Street Journal,

Under pressure from investors unhappy with the health insurer's performance and direction, WellPoint Inc. Chief Executive Angela Braly resigned Tuesday, and the company's board said it would begin a search for a permanent replacement.

The abrupt shift came as the board's leadership had been meeting with major investors in the wake of a disappointing second-quarter earnings report that sharpened concerns about Ms. Braly and the company's strategy

Note that while this change was seemingly dramatic,

In its statement, the board signaled that WellPoint's direction might not change dramatically. Ms. Ward said that the board 'continues to believe that time will prove the wisdom of potentially transformative actions taken under Angela's leadership…But now is the right time for a leadership change.' She also said the board believes 'the remaining executive team is dynamic and strong, with great potential to drive WellPoint's future success.'

In addition, the Indianapolis Star suggested that Ms Braly would be richly rewarded for her departure:

Details about her exit package were not released Tuesday, but under her contract, she is entitled to at least $7.7 million if terminated without cause.

Furthermore, recall how much the board apparently thought of Ms Braly's leadership in the immediate past, as evidenced by the compensation she received. In 2011, her total compensation was a mere $13.2 million (see this article in the Indianapolis Star), just slightly less than that in 2010, $13.4 million (see this post). Such compensation, of course is gargantuan compared to that received by mere mortals such as primary care physicians (actually, conservatively it is at least 66, and probably more like 100 times that of primary care physician, and over 250 times the median US family income) Such compensation, and the likelihood of a rich severance package, suggests that either the board applauded Ms Braly's leadership right up until now, or perhaps that Ms Braly, despite being a hired employee, actually had more power than the board, sufficient to virtually set her own pay.

Was Financialization the Reason She Had to Go?

So why get rid of her now? Aside from references to recent issues with only short-term revenue, there were few hints in the media. The WSJ article did note

a series of stumbles over the past few years, including an unexpected earnings hit last year tied largely to problems with a Medicare plan in California. In 2010, the company scaled back a proposed rate increase in California that had become a lightning rod in the policy debate over a health overhaul, leading to a loss.

A Forbes post suggested that one problem was Ms Braly supported President Obama's health care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, or ACA):

Many blame Braly and her team for putting The Affordable Care Act over the top in Congress after Wellpoint’s Anthem Blue Cross plan in California two years ago raised rates nearly 40 percent on individual policyholders before the increase was tamed. Many at the time say that provided President Obama and Sebelius political momentum and ammunition to tell the story of excessive rate increases by the loathed insurance industry.

However, no media report so far has raised the issue of the ethics of past WellPoint behavior. In fact, as we have discussed, (most recently here), the company has made a lengthy series of ethical missteps, to put it kindly. (The complete list appears in an appendix at the end of this post.) These problems have been going on for quite a while, and if they were not a concern before, there is no hint that they became a concern within the company recently.

So, one explanation for the sudden leadership change is the dominance of financialization of for-profit health care insurance (and likely of all health care organizations.) The notion, pushed by a few economists in the 1980s, that the only thing that should matter to corporate leadership is short-term financial results may be that powerful (see this post). Of course, that is profoundly troubling for health care organizations, since it dismisses the importance of any long-term results, especially of results that affect patients' and the public's health, and the importance of values like honesty.

Corporate Leadership as Our New Royalty and Nobility

Another explanation, which need not contradict the one above, was suggested by Charles Ferguson in Predator Nation. He wrote that the leadership of big financial corporations, which became the dominant organizations in the US and, indeed, in the world,

became corporate royalty, with all the absurd arrogance, disconnections from reality, ego poisoning, and cults of personality thereby implied.

If the leadership of big financial firms became royalty, then the leadership of big health care organizations became nobility. The issues above only would affect nobility slightly less. In that sense, the departure of Ms Braly likely resulted from personal and political battles among royalty. The good thing is that in this somewhat more enlightened age, the results are merely abdication, probably with a huge severance payment. In the old days, the results would likely have been imprisonment in the castle dungeon, if not beheading.

Nonetheless, the notion that top corporate leaders, including leaders of for-profit and non-profit health care corporations, are becoming the new royalty and nobility should be profoundly disturbing in the US, which was founded after a revolution against royalty's excess power.  They should be no less disturbing in other countries which have overthrown their former royal leaders, or instituted constitutional monarchies in which the royals and nobles have little political or real power. 

Obviously, the growing power and decreasing accountability of hired managers of large health care organizations has become a major reason, if not the major reason for health care dysfunction.  True health care reform would decrease the size and scope of health care organizations, and make their leaders accountable to ownership, when appropriate, and to the community at large for patients' and the public health. 

Appendix: WellPoint's Ethical Misadventures

• settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see 2005 post here).
• subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see 2007 story here).
• California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post here).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post here).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post here).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post here). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post here).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post here).
• California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contracts (see 2007 post here).
• formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post here).
• announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post here).
• was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see 2009 post here).
• settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (built by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see 2009 post here). 
• violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, according to the California health insurance commissioner (see 2010 post here).
• exposed confidential data from about 470,000 patients (see 2010 post here) and settled the resulting lawsuit in 2011 (see post here).
• fired a top executive who publicly apologized for the company's excessively high charges (see 2010 post here).
• California Anthem subsidiary was fined for systematically failing to make fair and timely payments to doctors and hospitals (see 2010 post here).
• management was accused of hiding the company's political contributions from the company's own stock-holders (see 2012 posts here and here).
• settled charges that its Anthem subsidiary cheated former policy-holders out of money owed when that company was converted from a mutual insurance company (see 2012 post here)

An Even Bigger Golden Parachute for Captain Outrageous

In 2009, I first posted about the amazingly colorful leadership and governance problems at a small hospital system in Massachusetts. 

Background: Northeast Health System

The story of Northeast Health System then included  leaders who solicited money from the community but concealed what they were doing from the same community, an adolescent pregnancy pact after the hospital system refused to provide confidential birth control information at the high school clinic it ran, a hospital vice-president accused of art theft, various cuts, some concealed, of medical services, accusations of conflicts of interest affecting the board of trustees, and no-confidence votes by nurses and physicians. Finally, Stephen Laverty, the CEO held responsible for much of the mess, resigned and things quieted down a bit.  However, he left a system in deficit, leading to further lay-offs, (e.g., see this story in the Boston Globe).  And the vice-president accused of art theft was also "arraigned on bribery and larceny charges" (also per the Boston Globe.)

Nonetheless, in 2010, it was revealed that Mr Laverty left with a golden parachute worth more than $1 million.  But wait, now there is more.

A Guilty Plea
In May, 2012, per the Salem News,

A former associate vice president at Beverly Hospital pleaded guilty yesterday to soliciting bribes and kickbacks from hospital contractors and stealing valuable paintings and other antiques while overseeing a $50 million renovation of the facility.

Paul Galzerano, 60, was sentenced to serve 18 months of a two-year jail term on four larceny counts and two years of probation on two counts of commercial bribery during a hearing yesterday at Salem Superior Court.

Yet More Severance Payments


But wait, there is even more. Yesterday, the Gloucester Times reported about Mr Galzerano's former boss,

Nearly four years after he resigned under fire, former Northeast Health System CEO Stephen Laverty is still collecting big paychecks from his former employer.

Laverty was paid $573,348 in severance in 2011, the second year in a row he has received buyout money from Northeast, the parent nonprofit corporation to Beverly Hospital and Gloucester’s Addison Gilbert Hospital, and a corporation that was essentially merged with Lahey Clinic to become the new Lahey Health System under an agreement that gained the necessary state approvals earlier this year.

Laverty's total severance payments have reached "more than $1.56 million over those two years." Whether the payments have ended is not clear. Attempts to discover why payments continued and became so large revealed only,

Beverly Hospital released a statement Monday saying, 'We cannot comment on Mr. Laverty or the terms of any agreements between the company and past employees.'

Summary

For a relatively small hospital system, Northeast Health System has produced an enormous example of the perverse incentives given to top executives of health care organizations. Mr Laverty has been made a millionaire despite what the Gloucester Times called in its news article a "tenure plagued by acrimony and controversy," and leadership previously described in a Gloucester Times editorial as "arrogant, dictatorial," and a history of what only can be described as outrageous management failures. Furthermore, the money he received came not from rich stockholders, but from a struggling community hospital system.

The ability of top executives of many, probably most health care organizations to collect bloated paychecks out of proportion to, if not despite their performance attracts the wrong people to lead these organizations, and provides incentives for even the right people to lead badly. 

Until we make health care leaders accountable, and until their incentives reflect their ability to uphold the health care mission, expect more unaccountable leadership that subverts the health care mission, and hence continually rising costs, declining access, and deteriorating quality. 

When Does Lavish Executive Compensation Become "Embezzlement?"

A single article in the Miami Herald raises the question of when is excessive executive compensation in health care too excessive.  To set up the question, I will be quoting from the story in an order quite differently from how the story was presented.

Background

The story is about the executives of the Miami Beach Community Health Center, described thus:

Headquartered on Biscayne Boulevard in North Miami, the Miami Beach Community Health Center is one of the oldest and most well-respected public health clinics in Florida. It opened more than three decades ago, and now includes four locations, three on the Beach, including two sites that care for people with mental illness. The center employs more than 280 people, with a monthly payroll of around $1.2 million.

The health center’s annual budget is about $36 million — about one-third of which comes from private insurance, Medicaid, the state and federal health insurance for needy people, Medicare, the federal insurer for elders, and private payments.

The CEO's Compensation

Previous stories, and public records suggested that the Center's CEO, Kathryn Abbate, was very well compensated. First,

an October 2010 Miami Herald business story ..., relying on federal tax documents, reported Abbate’s compensation package as $824,000 in 2008. In the article, Abbate said the compensation package was inflated by cashed-out sick time, vacation time and a retirement account.

She did even better in subsequent years,

The Miami Beach Community Health Center’s federal tax report for 2010 indicates Abbate’s base salary was $261,165 — but includes an additional $956,584 in 'bonus and incentive' dollars that pushed her total compensation to more than $1.2 million. The center’s IRS disclosure for the prior year reported Abbate’s base salary as $970,532, and total compensation of $987,902. In 2008, Abbate’s total reported compensation was $824,686, records show.

The CEO got very generous compensation given the size of her organization.  This compensation was documented on forms the organization submitted to the IRS that were in the public domain.

However, as we have discussed many times before (look here), many leaders of health care organizations, including non-profit organizations, have been collecting very generous compensation.

The Role of the Board of Trustees

As we have discussed before, e.g., here, exceptional compensation for top hired managers is often justified by the governing boards, that is, boards of trustees or directors, to whom the hired managers nominally report.  These governing board members often seem to be working off a common set of "talking points." 

In this case, there was a difference. The Herald reported that the Centers board of trustees "never agreed to pay Abbate more than $300,000, [Center Chief Medical Officer Dr Mark] Rabinowitz said."

The board seemed totally unaware of what their organization was paying its CEO.

Rabinowitz and a health center spokeswoman, Alia Faraj-Johnson, said that board members they spoke to had not seen the [2010] newspaper story [about the CEO's 2008 compensation]until just recently, and acknowledged its content would have raised significant red flags.

'That would have tripped everybody’s light,' Rabinowitz said.

Why the board had never thought to look at the organization's own reports (990 forms) to the US Internal Revenue Service which detailed the executives' compensation, reports that were in the public domain, and are easily available online (look here), is unknown.

The article implied that the board was somehow not up to this task even though it has fiduciary responsibilities to oversee the top hired managers, oversee the overall budget, and try to maintain both the organization's mission and fiscal stability did not seem up to the task. The article noted,

board members remained unaware until last spring. Under federal law, at least half of the board members of federally subsidized health centers such as Miami Beach’s must be consumers of the clinic, and some of the clinic’s board members were simply ill-equipped to detect what the center calls a sophisticated financial crime.

The board members seemed to think that it was the job of the CEO's subordinates to keep tabs on her compensation,

'One of the sad things about this, regrettably, is that if the gatekeeper in this case, the chief financial officer, had done his job, a large portion of this would have been discovered a long time ago,' said Bill Dillon, a Tallahassee-based healthcare lawyer who is advising the center.

The Chief Financial Officer contended that he would not have been able to successfully blow the whistle:

[CFO Stanley] DeHart, who lives in Coral Springs, said he was aware of many of Abbate’s activities, but declined to alert the board of directors. 'The board of directors was very close to her, and I really thought they would not believe me,' DeHart said. 'They held her in very high esteem.'

DeHart and members of his staff 'discussed whistle-blowing,' he said, but they all agreed taking such an action was more likely to result in their firing than Abbate’s. 'I felt at the time, and I still feel, that I had no proof that the board of directors would accept.'

And, DeHart added, blame for the scandal should include outside auditors, who failed to raise any objections when Abbate wrote dozens of checks to herself for 'community development' — a department that regularly generated an enormous amount of 'abnormal activity.' DeHart said he told auditors he suspected something was amiss in the community development department.

'The external auditors had to have known about this,' DeHart said, 'because I laid it out to them in plain view. I did not hide anything.'

In fact, the CEO's total compensation, plus a variety of other payments she seemed to direct to herself, were not made clear until

May, after a routine audit required by federal funders turned up irregularities, said Mark Rabinowitz, an obstetrician and gynecologist who is the center’s chief medical officer. Abbate had written a check for $5,000 to herself, and cashed it, labeling the expenditure a 'community development' expense....

Only after that,

Calling the actions of their former administrator an 'outrageous betrayal of trust,' authorities with the Miami Beach Community Health Center are investigating what they call the theft of almost $7 million in taxpayer money by the center’s longtime chief executive.

Members of the health center’s board of directors fired Chief Executive Officer Kathryn Abbate, saying she diverted the nearly $7 million in money intended to provide healthcare for the needy to her personal use beginning in 2008.

Summary

So let me backtrack a bit. The board of a moderately big, non-profit community health center seemed to make no attempt to monitor the organization's finances, did not even review the organization's own filings with the US government, and therefore had no idea what they were paying their CEO. Nonetheless, they seemed to assume that the organization's finances would be kept in order by an executive who reported to that same CEO. When an audit ordered externally ordered revealed that the CEO was being paid much more than the board had assumed, they charged "embezzlement," again even though a good chunk of such payments were in the form of compensation reported to the US government.

The real distinction between this case and many other cases of huge executive compensation we have discussed is that in this one the board seemed to be trying to maintain "plausible deniability" of any knowledge of the CEO's compensation, even though supervising that compensation was its direct responsibility. In other cases, board seem fully aware of enormous compensation, but blithely dismissive of any concerns about it. 

So does this case could represent "embezzlement, " why were all the other cases of hired managers lavishly compensated not so regarded, even when their compensation was completely out of proportion to their known accomplishments, their organizations' financial performance, much less their organizations' fulfillment of their missions and positive impact on patients' and the public's health?  In many of those cases, the money paid out in executive compensation was also partially derived from taxpayers, and also was partially meant to "provide healthcare for the needy."

As I have said many times before,...  Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.