Showing posts with label conflict of interest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conflict of interest. Show all posts

Sunday, April 29, 2012

Insurers' diversification creating monopoly power and conflict of interest - quoted in the Washington Post

I am quoted in a Washington Post article today on potential conflicts of interest when medical payers/insurers acquire the firms that hospitals and doctors use to challenge medical payment denials:

 "Health insurers’ push to diversify raises ethical concerns"

Washington Post
Jay Hancock, Sunday, April 29


Like hospitals and doctors everywhere, Banner Health fights a daily battle to get paid by insurance companies and government agencies for the care it delivers.  So the hospital system hired a company called Executive Health Resources to fight back against the likes of Medicare and UnitedHealthcare when they deny claims or pay bills for less than what Banner thinks it is owed.

Fair enough.

But Banner executives began to worry about EHR’s independence when the firm was acquired in 2010 by UnitedHealth Group, UnitedHealthcare’s parent.

Issues can get a bit sticky under such an arrangement.

I put it this way:

Critics call United’s ownership of EHR a troubling conflict of interest that could give it confidential information about rivals as well as patients and limit EHR’s power to demand payment from its much larger corporate sister. “How is that ownership going to affect the mission of a company whose business is to extract more money from payers?” said Scot Silverstein, a physician and specialist in medical software and patient records at Drexel University. “Imagine going to a plaintiff’s lawyer to take your malpractice case and not knowing that plaintiff’s lawyer actually works for the hospital that you’re suing.”

When payers acquire those who would challenge their payment denials, I worry about the consolidation of power being too great for the public good.

As we learn, the relationship is somewhat stealthy:

... There is no mention of EHR’s ownership in the “Corporate Overview” section of its Web site or elsewhere on the site. Nor did the American Hospital Association identify EHR as a United subsidiary in September when it renewed its exclusive endorsement of EHR’s denial-fighting services. EHR pays the hospital association a fee for the endorsement. The group declined to disclose the amount. 

The plot thickens:

Claims consultants such as EHR typically gain access to millions of patient records and confidential contracts between hospitals and insurers, industry officials say. If UnitedHealthcare, United’s insurance wing, gained access to that data, it would obtain “a huge business advantage” over insurance rivals as well as the hospitals, Kofman said.

In today's healthcare business environment, "if" seems to me to be optimistic.

Hancock goes further in the article:

As insurers eager to add revenue streams convert themselves into diversified health-services companies, they often buy traditional business adversaries, including physician groups and hospital consultants such as EHR. They’re also buying technology companies and research firms that serve medical-care providers, raising questions not only about independence but about the privacy of patient information.

A Georgetown professor, formerly a state insurance superintendent, gets to the heart of the matter, using United as but one example:

“I am not convinced that, even with proper disclosure, that an entity owned by United could aggressively advocate against United’s interests,” said Mila Kofman, a Georgetown professor who was Maine’s insurance superintendent.

This factoid is eye-opening:

Appealing claims denials has become a huge, high-tech business, reflected in the more than $1 billion that United reportedly paid for EHR [Executive Health Resources].

You might think there were better things to do with $1 billion besides administrative bloat - such as taking care of patients.

We probably need new laws to catch up with the flurry of M&A's going on in healthcare between payers, the healthcare delivery sector, and the "referees" that mediate between them when disputes arise.

Read the entire article at the WaPo link above.  The examples get even more convoluted.

-- SS

Addendum:

Roy Poses notes:

This appears to be a newly recognized type of conflict of interest that contributes to the concentration of power in the US commercialized health care system.  While many people tout how our health care system is "competitive" and a "free market," it is ever more dominated by a decreasing number of enlarging organizations.  True health care reform would break up health care oligopolies.

-- SS

Friday, January 27, 2012

Wikipedia page on EHR's: ==Disadvantages== material seems to keep disappearing

It's interesting how most of the information below seems to have a hard time "staying put" on the Wikipedia page for "Electronic Health Record" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_health_record

The information is presented in a neutral fashion from impeccable sources. Yet several Wikipedia "editors" take issue with it and, rather then editing it or refuting it (and stating their rationale and sources!), they keep deleting it. (The most recent edit history comments follow this "disappearing" information, at the bottom of this post):


==Disadvantages==

===Software quality and usability deficiencies===
EHR software is unregulated, unlike computer systems used both in the development and production of, and as a part of pharmaceutical products, medical devices, food, blood establishments, tissue establishments, and clinical trials.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validation_%28drug_manufacture%29 Other life-critical industries also have strict software validation and testing standards, e.g., Federal Aviation Administration, NASA.http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1019261http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040014965_2004000657.pdf.

As a result, EHR software quality and usability is often suboptimal. For example, in "A study of an Enterprise Health information System", March 2011, a Medical Informatics researcher at [[University of Sydney]] in Australia found that a major EHR system for Emergency Departments slated for deployment in the public hospitals of [[New South Wales]] has serious deficiencies in software architecture and fit with clinician workflow. These deficiencies make it difficult to use and unreliable in terms of data integrity and loss, in one of the most demanding of clinical environments .http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~hitru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=146

The [[Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society]] (HIMSS), a very large U.S. healthcare IT industry trade group, observed that EHR adoption rates "have been slower than expected in the United States, especially in comparison to other industry sectors and other developed countries. A key reason, aside from initial costs and lost productivity during EMR implementation, is lack of efficiency and usability of EMRs currently available."http://www.himss.org/content/files/HIMSS_DefiningandTestingEMRUsability.pdf

Serious reliability and usability problems with the U.S. Department of Defense’s [[AHLTA]] EHR system have been reported to the Congress.http://www.usmedicine.com/articles/electronic-records-system-unreliable-difficult-to-use-service-officials-tell-congress.html

The U.S. [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]] (NIST) issued a Sept. 2011 report on deficient usability of current EHR systems, with recommendations for usability evaluation, testing and validation.http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/usability/upload/Draft_EUP_09_28_11.pdf

===Unintended adverse consequences===
EHRs can introduce new unintended consequences, compared to paper records, and adverse outcomes, including patient injury and death, according to regualtory and governmental agencies, researchers, and others; for example, in an internal 2009 FDA memorandumhttp://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-IT.pdf of Feb. 23, 2010 obtained and released by the Huffington Post Investigative Fundhttp://web.archive.org/web/20110425002322/http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/08/fda-obama-digital-medical-records-team-odds-over-safety-oversight, EHR-related medical errors are categorized as: errors of commission (EOC), errors of omission or transmission (EOT), errors in data analysis (EDA), and incompatibility between multi-vendor software applications or systems (ISMA).

The [[National Health Service]] (NHS) in the UK reports specific examples of EHR-caused patient harms in a 2009 document on guidance on the management of clinical risk relating to the deployment and use of health software, Annex A "Examples of potential harm presented by health software."http://www.isb.nhs.uk/documents/isb-0160/dscn-18-2009/0160182009specification.pdf.

Also, in "Research in Ambulatory Patient Safety 2000–2010: A 10-year review", Dec. 2011http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ethics/research-ambulatory-patient-safety.pdf, the American Medical Association reports:

:While health IT may confer benefits, some research has also suggested that health IT systems can create new issues or exacerbate existing problems. Wachter noted that, “[i]n both professional and lay publications, concerns have been raised that today’s electronic health records promote the copying and pasting of clinical information, instead of its thoughtful analysis; foster a focus on completing computerized checklists and templates rather than detailed probing of the patient’s history, and support less thoughtful diagnostic reasoning and more automatic behavior on the part of caregivers." Research indicates that a great deal depends on the design of the health information technology system, with poorly designed systems contributing to instances of errors (Ash et al). Where user interface designs are cumbersome to use and do not fit into the clinician’s natural work context, some have noted the potential for “cognitive overload,” among other reactions, and ultimately the possibility of increasing errors in data entry and retrieval as well as errors in the process of communication and coordination (Ash et al, Singh et al).


In the U.S., FDA's MAUDE (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) databasehttp://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/search.CFMreveals many reported EHR problems, some of which could result in patient injury or death http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html. Both FDA (in the 2010 memo referenced above) and the [[Institute of Medicine]] of the National Academies in a 2011 study http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF reveal that EHR-related injuries and deaths are real, but the true extent is likely understated, they report, due to numerous factors impeding diffusion of knowledge such as contractual gag and hold harmless clauseshttp://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/12/1276.extract and lack of familiarity by users of where to report EHR-related adverse events (per aforementioned 2009 FDA internal memo). A Medical Informatics researcher in the U.S. has compiled a well-referenced teaching site that covers unintended consequences of EHRs, health IT project difficulties and failure and related issues{{cite web | last=Silverstein| first=Scot| year=2012 | url=http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/ | title=Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties| publisher=Drexel University |accessdate=2012-01-26}}.

The literature is conflicting on benefits and harms of EHRs http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html, and as in the Jan. 2009 U.S. National Academies study "COMPUTATIONAL TECHNOLOGY FOR EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE: IMMEDIATE STEPS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS", EHR's ultimate success will depend upon accelerating interdisciplinary research in biomedical informatics, computer science, social science, and health care engineering.http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12572

===Regulatory controversy===
FDA's Jeffrey Shuren, MD JD, Director of the [[Center for Devices and Radiological Health]] (CDRH), has explicitly declared EHRs are a medical device.http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_11673_910717_0_0_18/3Shuren_Testimony022510.pdf So has the [[Medical Products Agency (Sweden)]]; Swedish law for medical devices is based on EU Directives.http://www.lakemedelsverket.se/upload/foretag/medicinteknik/en/Medical-Information-Systems-Report_2009-06-18.pdf. In medicine, legal and ethical standards such as the NIH Guidelines for Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjectshttp://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/index.html and the World Medical Association Declaration Of Helsinkihttp://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/helsinki.html restrict introduction of new drugs and medical devices without informed consent, and without extensive preclinical and clinical testing and post-marketing surveillance, especially when risks of the technology are unknown. As in the 2011 U.S. [[Institute of Medicine]] study "Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care"http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF, there are calls for formal governmental regulation of the technology.


The edit-history comments are quite interesting, where a poster who uses the ID "Barek" keeps deleting all or most of the information on EHR disadvantages, despite indications the material is impeccably sourced and does not draw its own conclusions. Read from bottom to top:


17:29, 27 January 2012‎ Ohnoitsjamie (talk | contribs)‎ (67,826 bytes) (please discuss on talk page, as you are approaching WP:3RR)

17:28, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,232 bytes) (clarifying that information comes from the cited sources.)

17:26, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,137 bytes) (→Unintended adverse consequences)

17:24, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,151 bytes) (If you have factual disageements, let them be known and document the source of your information.)

17:23, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,137 bytes) (If you have factual disageements, let them be known and document the source of your information.)

17:18, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,122 bytes) (Undid revision 473542684 by Barek (talk). Barek may have a conflict of interest regarding exposure of health IT difficulties.)

17:14, 27 January 2012‎ Barek (talk | contribs)‎ m (67,826 bytes) (Reverted edits by InformaticsMD (talk) to last version by Barek)

17:14, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,122 bytes) (→Regulatory controversy)

17:12, 27 January 2012‎ InformaticsMD (talk | contribs)‎ (76,217 bytes) (The added information is factual, well-referenced from impeccable sources, and does not draw conclusions.)

17:08, 27 January 2012‎ Barek (talk | contribs)‎ (67,826 bytes) (→Disadvantages: restore some content after purging WP:SYNTH material)

17:06, 27 January 2012‎ Ohnoitsjamie (talk | contribs)‎ (65,826 bytes) (rv per WP:SYNTH)

17:01, 27 January 2012‎ 108.16.62.235 (talk)‎ (76,341 bytes) (Undid revision 473539844 by Barek (talk))

16:57, 27 January 2012‎ Barek (talk | contribs)‎ (65,826 bytes) (rv - some of that content is usable - but most is pure WP:SYNTH, attempting to draw conclusions rather than simply stating what's in the sources - requires a total re-write to be encyclopedic)

...
20:22, 26 January 2012‎ SarekOfVulcan (talk | contribs)‎ (65,058 bytes) (→Unintended Adverse Consequences: actually, remove whole section - BAD HANDWRITING can result in patient injury and death)

20:21, 26 January 2012‎ SarekOfVulcan (talk | contribs)‎ (65,860 bytes) (→Unintended Adverse Consequences: If it's unknown, we don't need to report it. If it's not a RS, we don't need to report its conclusions. And "a researcher says" isn't notable enough to mention without establishing authority in the subject) (undo)



I note that the logically fallacious "Bad handwriting can cause patient injury and death, so remove whole EHR Unintended Adverse Consequences section" and "if it's unknown, we don't need to report it" [regarding the referenced FDA and IOM observations that the true extent of EHR adverse consequences is unknown -- which is on its face a matter critical to public health and policy - ed.], coming from an editor who ironically calls him/herself "Sarek of Vulcan", offers a prime example of how the utopian concept of tapping "community wisdom" can fall flat on its face.

WP:SYNTH is Wikipedia-talk for "Synthesis of published material that advances a position", i.e., "drawing conclusions." Apparently, when it comes to EHR, citing the work of governmental regulatory and healthcare agencies, expert researchers, etc. is "drawing conclusions."

Wikipedia is essentially open to all, including the HIT industry and its pundits.

It is possible that the Wikipedia editors who keep deleting the material could have some sort of conflict of interest. COI could cause them to find easily-verifiable information from impeccable sources on the Wikipedia EHR page (viewed 22924 times in the last 30 days as of this morning) that refutes common cybernetic legends to be "inconvenient." We've certainly seen that type of person before (link).

This affair may also be another example of the "anechoic effect", the notion we discuss often on this blog that certain topics in medicine and health care 'just aren't talked about', in action.

The 'disadvantages' material, revised, will be re-posted again soon, after my being blocked (for 'reverting', i.e., restoring the material three times in 24 hrs.) expires tomorrow. It will be revised to have as neutral a tone as possible, with exact page numbers where possible, in accordance with written Wikipedia examples. If the additions still disappear, that will be revelatory.

-- SS

Saturday, December 17, 2011

A comment posted to the website "Doctors Helping Doctors Transform Healthcare", Peter Basch, William Bria et al.

A new website has appeared that purports to be:

A collaborative effort led primarily by doctors for doctors to provide a "trusted resource" for physicians as they work to transform health care - initially through the use of health IT.

The site is entitled "Doctors Helping Doctors Transform Health Care" and is at this link. (I note that when one encounters such platitudinous and potentially highly ideological titles, one should ask "transform how, and into what, exactly?" I presume "transform" means, in part, to reduce risk and improve safety and outcomes - while protecting patient and physician rights.)

The site has a significant number of people on their advisory board (link), but no information on compensation. I note there are industry people involved, representing a potential conflict of interest.

According to one of the principals, Peter Basch, MD, Medical Director, Ambulatory EHR and Health Information Technology Policy, MedStar Health, Washington, DC, on funding:

A Few Words About Our Supporters

It takes resources to create and maintain this site, to make the work of Doctors Helping Doctors possible. We have solicited unrestricted contributions from individuals and organizations who believe in our mission and are able to support its work. In particular, we wish to thank Patrick Soon-Shiong of the Chan Soon-Shiong Family Foundation, John Glaser of Siemens Health Services; and Andy Slavitt of Optum’s Institute for Sustainable Health.


To my knowledge, I've never met Dr. Basch, but at meetings I have met one of the other principals of the new website, William Bria, III, MD, Chief Medical Information Officer, Shriners Hospitals for Children; President and Co-Founder, Association of Medical Directors of Information Systems (AMDIS), St. Petersburg, FL.

Dr. Basch's writing has appeared at Healthcare Renewal before, such as at the Jan. 2009 post "Throwing The National Research Council Report On Health IT Under The Bus, Part 1: MedStar Health."

In the new site, Dr. Basch states that:

As early adopters, EHR implementers, and practicing physicians, we have seen the “bad and the ugly” as well as the promise of health IT. We understand how health IT can and should be used to make care better, safer, and more value-laden. As such, we believe that unnecessarily harsh criticism of Meaningful Use—which we have heard from some quarters—and uncritical cheerleading—which we have also heard—are equally unhelpful.

We see physician “extremism” essentially marginalizing what is needed now more than ever—a clear and constructive physician voice, articulating not for compliance with Meaningful Use, but rather leveraging the opportunity that Meaningful Use presents, and consistently inserting the highest ideals that led us all to choose a career in medicine.

While on the surface this is not an unreasonable position, I fear the word "extremism" is used as a metaphor for those who express genuinely critical appraisals of the state of health IT as it now exists, on issues regarding safety, efficacy, usability, need for regulation, vendor, buyer and user liability, and other "unpleasant" topics.

I do note precious little on the site about educating physicians on the considerable downsides of health IT as it currently exists, nor on the scientific literature expressing doubts about its safety, efficacy, usability, ROI and other issues (such as here).

There is, it would seem obvious, no ethical excuse for introducing medical devices and other technology of unknown benefit and of unknown risk magnitude (as recently reported by the IOM, see this post), that is unregulated, into life-critical domains such as medicine without explicit acknowledgement of experimentation. Human subjects experimentation requires, of course, explicit informed consent under the many guidelines formulated as a result of past systemic abuses. Also, users need to be fully aware of the risks.

Such informed consent cannot be accomplished, and awareness attained by physicians regarding the dangers of use of health IT in its present form, through simple "best practices" protagonism.

For instance, health IT can be inherently defective and/or mission hostile (worse, the industry is unregulated), and can injure or kill. Several illustrative examples just off the top of my head are at:


Not even including privacy and confidentiality issues (see this query link on those issues), should physicians, nurses, patients and other stakeholders not be explicitly educated on the issues of risk, that can be greatly replicated/amplified across hundreds or thousands of patients by EHRs as opposed to paper, and on actual injuries and deaths that have occured? If not, why not?

Are not these issues and the issue of the lack of a culture of safety in the health IT field at least as important, if not more important for clinicians, patients, healthcare executives and other stakeholders to be strongly aware of than "best practices" and "meaningful use?"

(I note that the "negative reports are mere anecdotes" argument commonly used by health IT pundits only shows, as in the Aug. 2011 essay by a senior clinician in Australia "From a Senior Clinician Down Under: Anecdotes and Medicine, We are Actually Talking About Two Different Things", that those making that argument need to attend revision courses in research methodology and risk management.)

In consideration of the "Doctors Helping Doctors" site's seemingly uncritical pro-HIT advocacy, I have posted the following note at the end of Dr. Basch's introductory essay. The comment appears at this link and is awaiting moderation.

The comment's remaining online would be a sign that the site is not another attempt to "control the channel", and is truly serious about being "trusted." It would be a sign of a site truly concerned with "physicians helping physicians transform health care" while not sacrificing patients as unconsenting test subjects of unregulated, experimental software-based medical devices in the process.

S Silverstein MD says:
Doctors,

One way to help doctors transform healthcare would be to educate them on the downsides of information technology in healthcare, how to avoid them, and the conflicting literature on benefits (e.g., as at http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=readinglist).

I do not see such information here yet.

I do expect some such information will follow.

Sincerely,

Scot Silverstein

---------------------------------------------------
Scot M. Silverstein, MD
Consultant/Independent Expert Witness in Healthcare Informatics (May 2010-present)
Adjunct faculty in Healthcare Informatics and IT (Sept. 2007-present)
Assistant Professor of Healthcare Informatics and IT, and Director, Institute for Healthcare Informatics (2005-7)

Drexel University
College of Information Science and Technology
3141 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104-2875

Email: sms88 AT drexel DOT e-d-u
Bio: http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/biography.htm
Common Examples of Healthcare IT Difficulties: http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/

Note: I am cross-posting this comment on Healthcare Renewal blog under the title "A comment posted to the website 'Doctors Helping Doctors Transform Healthcare, Peter Basch, William Bria et al.'"

It is my hope the comment stays, and receives a reasoned reply.

-- SS

Dec. 23, 2011 addendum:

My comment appears to have disappeared. I leave it to the reader to determine what that means about the site "Doctors Helping Doctors Transform Healthcare."

-- SS

Tuesday, March 23, 2010

DR. PANGLOSS AS NIH INSTITUTE DIRECTOR

DR. PANGLOSS AS NIH INSTITUTE DIRECTOR

JAMA is out today with a Commentary by Dr. Thomas Insel, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health. Using indirection, Dr. Insel has risen to the defense of seven academic psychiatrists on whom an ethical searchlight has been trained for the past several years by Senator Grassley and others. With ludicrous optimism and a series of straw man discussions, Dr. Insel makes the case that things are not really as bad as they seemed to be or, if they were, then other specialty physicians were doing much the same things. Dr. Insel needs to recalibrate his ethical compass.

Why is an NIH Institute Director issuing this apologia for the corruption of academic psychiatry? Does he not have better things to do, such as ensuring that longstanding NIH regulations on conflict of interest are enforced? Why does an NIH Institute Director presume to speak for academic psychiatry? Where are the leaders of the major professional and scientific organizations like the American Psychiatric Association, the American College of Psychiatrists, the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology, and the Society of Biological Psychiatry? Why are they not stepping up publicly to the plate? Perhaps they are confounded by the awkward fact that some of the seven individuals are current and past presidents of these very organizations. Even the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences has not sanctioned those of the seven who are Institute members.

Why is an NIH Institute Director downplaying the gravity of the ethical controversies surrounding these compromised individuals like Charles Nemeroff at Emory (now at Miami), and Alan Schatzberg at Stanford? To hear Dr. Insel tell it, all they did was fail to disclose income from pharmaceutical companies. That is not the half of it. Readers can look here and here for much more detail on the activities of Nemeroff and Schatzberg. If Dr. Insel chose to remain ignorant of or to overlook the history of false claims on behalf of pharmaceutical corporations or the concealment of consulting relationships or the complaisance with ghostwriting or the patently misleading “educational” presentations or the cashing in through stock sales or the editorial self dealing, then Dr. Insel’s fitness to serve as an NIH Institute Director needs to be reviewed.

Surely Dr. Insel knows that Nemeroff and the others worked mainly with the marketing personnel within pharmaceutical companies. Nemeroff’s staggering schedule of promotional talks for GlaxoSmithKline, released by Senator Grassley, is testament to that. So is Nemeroff’s record of priming the pump for himself with GSK by giving the corporation unpublished research data from NIMH-funded projects at Emory. In turn, GSK and its medical education communications company, Scientific Therapeutics Information, Inc., incorporated Nemeroff’s privileged material in the training manual for PsychNet – a speaker program designed to build advocacy for GSK’s antidepressant drug Paxil. These issues go well beyond just failing to report income. They signify the corruption of academic psychiatry. Doesn’t Dr. Insel understand that?

In his Commentary, Dr. Insel reported no financial disclosures. This is a good example of the problem that Dr. Insel doesn’t see. Many readers will interpret this Commentary from the Director of NIMH as the opening move in the attempted rehabilitation of Charles Nemeroff by his friends and cronies. Though Dr. Insel spoke in platitudes about the need for transparency as a solution, the spirit of transparency did not move him to disclose that Nemeroff is his former boss at Emory; that Nemeroff found a position for him when Insel was departing the intramural research program at NIMH; that Nemeroff lobbied for Insel’s appointment as NIMH Director; and that Insel appointed Nemeroff as an advisor soon after he moved to NIMH. These are pertinent conflicts of interest that readers of JAMA deserve to know about. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Maybe Dr. Insel should stick to his knitting and resist the impulse to speak for academic psychiatry as a whole. A good place for him to start looking hard would be at the productivity and accounting of the once vaunted Emory-GSK-NIMH Collaborative Mood Disorders Initiative (Principal Investigator Charles B. Nemeroff; 5U19MH069056). One never knows what one will find when the rocks are turned over.

Saturday, March 20, 2010

Study: Researchers with Glaxo ties favored Avandia

As mentioned in my previous post on the MIT controversy surrounding an economist's testifying to Congress on healthcare policy without revealing possible economic conflicts of interest that could affect his views, frequently expressed on this blog are concerns about undisclosed conflicts of interest and their corrosive effects upon healthcare (query link).

One major question that arises is the degree to which conflicts of interest can affect the integrity of the scientific literature. Answering this question is more a matter of social science research rather than biomedical inquiry.

One internal medicine resident at the Mayo Clinic took on this challenge and published such a study, a systematic review, in the British Medical Journal. It is entitled "Association between industry affiliation and position on cardiovascular risk with rosiglitazone: cross sectional systematic review" (BMJ 2010;340:c1344).

Mayo Clinical researchers led by the resident, Amy Wang, examined more than 200 articles that appeared after an analysis in the NEJM linked Avandia to a 43 percent increased risk of heart attacks, and a subsequent clinical trial found no greater danger of heart disease. The results are fascinating. From a summary in the Philadelphia Inquirer:

"We aimed to determine whether financial conflicts of interest with pharmaceutical manufacturers could be fueling this fire," wrote the researchers, led by Amy Wang, a resident in internal medicine at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minn. "From our findings, it appears that the answer is yes.

From the BMJ article itself, free full text available as of this writing at link above:

For each article, we sought information about the authors’ financial conflicts of interest in the report itself and elsewhere (that is, in all publications within two years of the original publication and online). Two reviewers blinded to the authors’ financial relationships independently classified each article as presenting a favourable (that is, rosiglitazone does not increase the risk of myocardial infarction), neutral, or unfavourable view on the risk of myocardial infarction with rosiglitazone and on recommendations on the use of the drug.

The "and elsewhere" can be a valuable addition to the capabilities of today's researchers, often enabled via the internet (e.g., non-literature based resources such as conference brochures, personal web pages, corporate and other financial disclosures. etc.) when articles themselves prove unrevealing.

Overall, this is a straightforward methodology, and while potentially subject to bias and expertise issues, nonetheless seems an excellent new contribution to the needed social research on undisclosed COI's.

As to results (see the full article for statistical details I am omitting here):

Of the 202 included articles, 108 (53%) had a conflict of interest statement. Ninety authors (45%) had financial conflicts of interest. Authors who had a favourable view of the risk of myocardial infarction with rosiglitazone were more likely to have financial conflicts of interest with manufacturers of antihyperglycaemic agents in general, and with rosiglitazone manufacturers in particular, than authors who had an unfavourable view. There was likewise a strong association between favourable recommendations on the use of rosiglitazone and financial conflicts of interest. These links persisted when articles rather than authors were used as the unit of analysis, when the analysis was restricted to opinion articles or to articles in which the rosiglitazone controversy was the main focus, and both in articles published before and after the Food and Drug Administration issued a safety warning for rosiglitazone.

While causality is not proven, these results are still stunning. Per the Inquirer's summary:

... Almost 90 percent of scientists who wrote positive articles, reviews, or commentaries about Avandia had financial ties to London-based Glaxo, the study published in the British Medical Journal found.

Almost three of every four authors who expressed negative views of the drug had no financial ties to manufacturers of diabetes medicines, while just 6 percent of those with positive opinions of the drug received no funding or fees from industry.


The authors cite prior literature also demonstrating an associations of COI with pro-industry views (references 2-6; #2 is regarding the mid 1990's calcium channel blocker controversy).

The authors observe that:

In the past decade, research and policy has focused on this association [between COI and pro-industry views - ed.], leading to important progress in policies to manage and encourage disclosure of such financial conflicts of interest.

Their findings about the effects of this "progress" was particularly disappointing, that only about half of the articles carried conflict-of-interest statements:

Of the 202 eligible studies (10 reported original research, 91 were letters, editorials, or commentaries, and 101 were reviews, meta-analyses, or guidelines), 108 articles (53%) included a conflict of interest statement. [The other 47% did not - ed.]

One wonders about the publishers of the articles themselves omitting COI statements, either acknowledging possible COI's or confirming that no COI's exist.

... A total of 90 (45%) of the 202 articles were authored by individuals who had financial conflicts of interest. Of the 90 studies with conflicts of interest, 69 (77%) had a statement disclosing the conflict of interest in the article itself. The other 21 studies with financial conflicts of interest (23%) did not disclose these relationships, which were discovered through searching other publications by the same author or the internet. Three (14%) of these 21 studies published a statement declaring no conflicts of interest. [Oops - ed.]

So, almost one quarter of articles with author COI did not disclose that fact, and several misrepresented the issue.

Finally, the pharmaceutical company's view, also published in the Inquirer article cited above:

A Glaxo spokeswoman said the company posted information and results from all its clinical trials on its Web site.

"It's vital that people have trust in the way we do research and the way it's made public," Jo Revill, Glaxo spokeswoman, said yesterday. "Part of that is sharing data. What we have done is develop policies that will have disclosure and encourage disclosure."


"Encouraging" disclosure of COI's is far too weak a stand for a pharmaceutical company to take on such a critical issue, in my view.

The Mayo researchers wisely conclude:

Disclosure rates for financial conflicts of interest were unexpectedly low, and there was a clear and strong link between the orientation of authors’ expressed views on the rosiglitazone controversy and their financial conflicts of interest with pharmaceutical companies. Although these findings do not necessarily indicate a causal link between the position taken on the cardiac risk of rosiglitazone in patients with diabetes and the authors’ financial conflicts of interest, they underscore the need for further changes in disclosure procedures in order for the scientific record to be trusted.

Finally, I add that these findings are not too surprising. It's human nature not to bite the hand that feeds you. Money is also a powerful stimulant to the brain's rationalization (as opposed to rational) centers.

We as a culture do truly need to understand the potential corrosive effects on the scientific literature of dysfunctions such as ghostwriting, financial and other conflicts of interest, publish-or-perish pressures of academia, and other such social issues.

These practices also simply need to be abolished, for as I have written before on these pages ("Has Ghostwriting Infected The Experts With Tainted Knowledge, Creating Vectors for Further Spread and Mutation of the Scientific Knowledge Base?"), once a "critical mass" of faux knowledge is put into circulation via the scientific literature, even the ostensibly impartial experts' views can become tainted, dependent as they are on that very same scientific literature. Even worse, we don't know what that critical mass is - or whether we've reached it already.

-- SS

Thursday, November 5, 2009

Is Someone at Jefferson Regional Medical Center Lying About EHR Safety?

This curious story appeared about apparent clinician health IT safety concerns at Jefferson Regional Medical Center near Pittsburgh:

Switch to electronic records alarms Jefferson Regional physicians

By Walter F. Roche Jr.
PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW
Friday, October 30, 2009

Jefferson Regional Medical Center's attempts to convert to electronic medical records have some doctors concerned about patient safety.

In a memo issued this month, the hospital's Health Information Technology Committee announced the 373-bed facility in Jefferson Hills would revert to printed versions of patients' consultant reports "due to patient safety concerns from the majority of physicians."

Jefferson executives downplayed the memo and said they found no evidence that patient safety has been impacted, arguing a small group of physicians expressed concerns and not a majority, as the memo claimed.

"It was a very small number that were concerned. It wasn't the majority," said Dr. Richard F. Collins, Jefferson's vice president for medical affairs. "To this point, we haven't identified any issue of patient safety."


Now, one or the other must be true. Either a majority of physicians expressed concerns, or a small number did. Both cannot be true. Assuming the account in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review is accurate, someone is lying.

I should point out that the numbers ultimately do not matter - patient safety issues should never be determined via a headcount, and in fact hospital governance obligations under the Joint Commission and their own fiduciary responsibilities mandate the utmost conservatism and due diligence on safety concerns.

Perhaps the executives did find "no evidence" of safety issues. Regardless, I raise the following questions:

  • How was such a study performed, how were physicians and other clinicians involved in the study, and was it a rigorous study using validated methodologies, or cursory?
  • Who is most motivated to find an HIT system "safe", the HIT Committee and clinicians, or the administration?

I have served on HIT Committees; led them, in fact. Those committees "have the pulse" of clinician sentiment, even when they do not conduct formal surveys. In hospitals, the walls have ears, and the clinicians on HIT Committees understand what their colleagues are feeling - usually via direct and sometimes confrontational conversations.

HIT Committees charged with making HIT successful do not generally pull back from HIT projects without very good reason.

On the other hand, hospital executives who have signed off on investments of millions or tens of millions of dollars in IT investments do have a strong motive to ensure all goes well - either in reality or in the narrative they proffer.

This is especially true when conflicts of interest exist.

According to [VP for Medical Affairs] Collins and James Witenske, Jefferson's chief information officer, the transition [to EHR] began about a year ago and was completed in May. The hospital uses a system developed by Siemens, Collins said. He declined to disclose the cost.

I find this an interesting finding. After a short Google search, the following appeared:

Western Pennsylvania Hospital News

20 Years of Hospital Information Technology
by John Fries
(December 2005)

... James Witenske is chief information officer at Jefferson Regional Medical Center, having left Arthur Andersen four years ago to accept the position. Before working at the Big Eight firm, he served as chief information officer at UPMC Health System.

At Jefferson, IT takes place a bit differently that at other healthcare institutions. Where most hospitals have an IT department with staff, Witenske works almost exclusively with outside experts, one of whom is Ron Forys, a Siemens site executive who is based at Jefferson. It’s a complementary relationship – Witenske’s role is strategic and Forys’ is operational. Both are longtime technology professionals who have seen huge changes take place during the past two decades.


The hospital had/has its own vendor representative in a front line role, and apparently shied away from having its own IT staff. A person who comes from a consulting firm uses consultants whose loyalty is to the vendor, not the hospital, one of them as his operations guy.

This raises a number of questions:

  • Who paid/pays the Siemens Site Executive? The hospital, the vendor, or both?
  • Who did/does the Site Executive report to?
  • Did/does not the Site Executive have a conflict of interest with regard to physician opposition to the vendor's system?
  • What was/is the financial relationship between hospital executive leadership and the Site Executive? Between hospital executive leadership and the vendor?

These type of arrangements do raise my eyebrows, and the discrepancy between the HIT Committee's memo and the hospital executive's account, both of which cannot be true, could certainly be a symptom of conflicts of interest.

I have noted that a Congressional investigation of the health IT industry is now underway. This would not be a good time for hospital governance to downplay physician concerns about HIT, overruling their own HIT committee. For if a patient is injured or dies as a result of physician HIT concerns that were ignored, the executives could likely find themselves in a very unpleasant situation - and not just from malpractice attorneys.

Collins and other hospital officials who support the conversion say that once adopted and accepted, electronic records will increase patient safety and efficiency, and eliminate "piles of paper."

He apparently forgot the word "perfected." HIT in an experimental medical device. This VP for Medical Affairs makes no mention of the unintended consequences of poorly designed or implemented HIT. He either doesn't know about them (i.e., is dyscompetent regarding HIT) or is suffering the syndrome of inappropriate overconfidence in computers in the face of what seems like his own staff's concerns.

This is typical of the Wild West environment of Health IT.

-- SS